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A HEALTHY AMOUNT OF PRIVACY: 
QUANTIFYING PRIVACY CONCERNS IN 
MEDICINE 
IGNACIO N. COFONE* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
With recent developments in e-health, concerns have been raised regarding the 
privacy of patients who are monitored with such treatments. I propose a simple 
method to incorporate these concerns into a standard health impact evaluation, based 
on Quality Adjusted Life Years and the Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio. This 
method provides a way to objectively value privacy concerns and balance them with 
health benefits. Hence, it can guide doctors and policymakers into incorporating 
privacy considerations and making better choices regarding e-health programs. This 
method can also be tested on existing economic evaluations to compare outcomes 
and gauge the extent to which privacy issues in medical treatments should be taken 
seriously. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With recent developments in technical means of patient surveillance, particularly 
involving patients under observation with distance-monitoring treatments, concerns 
have been raised regarding the privacy of people monitored with such treatments.1 
For these treatments to be operational, a significant amount of personal, and often 
sensitive, information about the patient is sent electronically to the medical 
professionals or, more frequently, to a team of people involving both medical 
professionals and other actors.2 This information is sometimes sent together with 
other pieces of information, such as location data, which are not strictly necessary to 
treat the patient; nevertheless, the devices pick up such information.3 Consequently, 
a relevant drawback that these treatments present is that they cause a reduction of 
personal privacy and an increased risk of privacy breaches. These privacy concerns 
are not considered at the moment of evaluating their incorporation to patient 
treatments. 
An example of a remote patient monitoring method used by several hospitals in 
the U.S. is the use of electronic intensive care units (e-ICUs or tele-ICUs). 
Caregivers distantly monitor patients in e-ICUs through a set of cameras, 
microphones, other electronic monitoring systems, and smart alarms.4 E-ICUs, 
which are among the first types of remote patient monitoring treatments, are also 
among the most harmless to privacy. While this healthcare platform reduces 
healthcare costs,5 it also arguably reduces patients’ privacy.6 Another widespread 
device that is part of this category is wearable sensors. While these are usually used 
by caregivers to monitor patients from a distance, they are sometimes purchased 
directly by individuals to track their own health data as well, with no healthcare 
professional involved.7  
                                                            
 1 JOHN CAREY, POWER TO THE PATIENT: HOW MOBILE TECHNOLOGY IS TRANSFORMING 
HEALTHCARE 2-4 (Frieda Klotz ed., 2015). 
 2 See id. at 16. 
 3 See id. at 10. 
 4 Leo Celi et al., The eICU: It’s Not Just Telemedicine, 29 CRITICAL CARE MED. N183, 
N184-87 (2001) (Suppl.); Brian A. Rosenfeld et al., Intensive Care Unit Telemedicine: 
Alternate Paradigm for Providing Continuous Intensivist Care, 28 CRITICAL CARE MED. 3925, 
3925 (2000). 
 5 This reduction in costs is not a minor point, as it allows for the delivery of better 
healthcare to a larger number of people. Consequently, the World Health Organization has 
endorsed mobile health as a means of expanding affordable healthcare. Alastair van Heerda et 
al., Point of Care in Your Pocket: A Research Agenda for the Field of mHealth, 90 BULL. 
WORLD HEALTH ORGAN. (2012). 
 6 Celi et al., supra note 4, at N187. 
 7 See GINA NEFF & DAWN NAFUS, SELF-TRACKING (2016) (explaining the increasing 
tendency of self-tracking health data). The Nightscout project, for example, is a startup that 
sells a smart watch, marketed to parents of children with diabetes, that acts as a continuous 
glucose monitor and provides real-time access to its data from different devices. See Welcome 
to Nightscout, THE NIGHTSCOUT PROJECT, http://www.nightscout.info/ (last visited Aug. 21, 
2016). There is a wide array of fitness trackers that work in a similar way, such as Fitbit and 
Jawbone. Broadly speaking, this type of practice has been called consumer health informatics. 
See THOMAS WETTER, INT’L MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N, WORKING GROUP CONSUMER HEALTH 
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E-health, which combines these methods of electronic monitoring (called remote 
patient monitoring or telemedicine) with internet-supported electronic health records, 
has raised patients’ concerns.8 About half of respondents in a recent survey believe 
that consumers’ wariness about privacy violations will be a major obstacle for the 
adoption of mobile technology in healthcare.9 In addition, over half of respondents 
consider privacy risks to be the biggest concern of these technologies’ application to 
healthcare.10 Moreover, the patient is not the only person whose privacy may be 
compromised by a telemedicine application. Home monitors, for example, also affect 
others in the home. Privacy concerns in e-health are of central importance to the 
public. 
The lack of an objective way of taking privacy concerns into consideration when 
evaluating health policies underplays how much a loss of privacy can harm people 
and how much value people attribute to personal privacy. Moreover, this 
insufficiency is worrisome not only to privacy scholars, but also to proponents of e-
health policies. Unaddressed privacy concerns can lead (and in occasions have led) 
to the halt of new and potentially advantageous treatments.11 Harms to individual 
privacy, however, are difficult to observe and measure.12 
This article proposes a simple way to incorporate privacy considerations into a 
standard health impact evaluation. Privacy concerns could be incorporated into the 
Quality-Adjusted Life Year framework (QALY) and the Incremental Cost-
Effectiveness Ratio framework (ICER)—to which QALY can then be incorporated. 
QALY measures the quality and quantity of life improvements per medical 
treatment.13 ICER measures the costs of medical treatments compared to their 
                                                            
INFORMATICS REPORT AUGUST 2013 TO AUGUST 2014 (2014), http://www.imia-
medinfo.org/new2/sites/default/files/IMIA_WG-ConsHI_Rep2014.pdf.  
 8 While there is no unified definition of e-health, all uses of the term refer to the 
interaction between healthcare and new technologies, especially the internet. See Hans Oh et 
al., What Is eHealth (3): A Systematic Review of Published Definitions, 7 J. MED. INTERNET 
RES. 1, 4-6 (2005); G. Eysenbach, What is e-health?, 3 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 20, 20 (2001). 
The two most prominent facets of this concept are remote patient monitoring and internet-
supported electronic health records. This makes it narrower than health informatics or health 
information technology. Claudia Pagliari et al., What Is eHealth (4): A Scoping Exercise to 
Map the Field, 7 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 1, 10 (2005). For the purposes of this article, this 
concept includes mobile health, which involves remote patient monitoring by mobile devices. 
See Sofia Ranchordás & Bonnie Kaplan, MHealth for Alzheimer’s Disease: Regulation, 
Consent, and Privacy Concerns, in SHLOMIT YANISKY-RAVID, BEYOND IP: THE FUTURE OF 
PRIVACY (Fordham U. Press, forthcoming 2017). 
 9 CAREY, supra note 1, at 4, 14. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See infra Section V.C. 
 12 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New 
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1893 (2011); Daniel 
J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 745, 747, 754 (2007); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1087, 1088 (2002).  
 13 See Joseph S. Pliskin et al., Utility Functions for Life Years and Health Status, 28 
OPERATIONS RES. 206, 206 (1980); Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for 
Saving Lives?, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (1976); see also infra Section III.A. 
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effects, allowing for a comparison between treatments with different modalities.14 
The method proposed here estimates the dimension of privacy harms for patients 
and, in such a way, complements the privacy impact assessments analyses of how 
information is collected, stored, and disseminated. 
In order to do this, this article proposes performing an estimation of the privacy-
cost per treatment, contingent on the type of personal information involved. It 
suggests performing this estimation with a similar methodology to those used to 
evaluate QALY in health economics:  Visual Analogue Scale, Standard Gamble, and 
Time-Trade-Off. These evaluation methods capture the subjective views of patients 
and, therefore, the patients’ subjective harm. Such costs can either be used to weigh 
the QALY factor in itself or can be weighed together with health risks and monetary 
costs when evaluating the disadvantages of treatments in the ICER health impact 
evaluation. This application can be helpful to objectively value privacy concerns 
when balanced against health benefits. In doing so, it can guide policymakers into 
making better choices regarding e-health programs by incorporating privacy 
considerations when evaluating treatments. At a more abstract level, this analysis 
allows one to gauge the extent to which privacy should be taken seriously in e-
health. 
Section II of this article reviews the experimental literature that attempts to 
determine how much people value their privacy. Section III reviews QALY, ICER, 
and the tools used to measure health state valuations:  Visual Analogue Scale, 
Standard Gamble, and Time-Trade-Off. This article suggests these methods and 
tools should be used to measure privacy concerns. Drawing from the previous two 
sections, Section IV explains how to incorporate privacy concerns in cost-
effectiveness analyses; in order to do that, the section compares possible methods for 
evaluating privacy concerns under this framework, through monetary costs and 
health states. Section V presents further reasons and rationale to incorporate the 
proposed policy, particularly due to methodological concerns, policy considerations, 
and doctrinal implications. Section VI concludes this article. 
II. HOW MUCH IS PRIVACY WORTH 
A. Experimental Literature 
The easiest way to determine how much privacy is worth would be to know the 
magnitude of privacy harms and add them to the social cost of any treatment. 
However, the experimental literature on privacy has found it extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to determine how much privacy is worth. The “privacy paradox” 
describes the phenomenon in which people declare a high value for their private 
information in surveys, but in incentivized experiments, individuals disclose their 
information for low compensations.15 The studies on how much people value their 
privacy show inconsistencies between declared privacy values and privacy-related 
                                                            
 14 See Scott Ramsey et al., Good Research Practices for Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
Alongside Clinical Trials: The ISPOR RCT-CEA Task Force Report, 8 VALUE HEALTH 521 
(2005); see also infra Section III.C. 
 15 Bettina Berendt et al., Privacy in E-Commerce: Stated Preferences vs. Actual Behavior, 
48 COMM. ACM 101, 102, 104 (2005); Sarah Spiekermann et al., E-privacy in 2nd Generation 
E-Commerce: Privacy Preferences Versus Actual Behavior, in PROC. OF THE 3RD ACM 
CONFERENCE: ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 38, 45 (2001). 
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behavior online.16 Privacy concerns are a weak predictor of the amount of personal 
information disclosed.17 
Inconsistencies go beyond declared values. Independent from the inconsistencies 
mentioned, people display a low willingness to pay for safeguards on their personal 
information.18 Individuals’ valuations display a gap between the willingness to pay 
to protect information and the willingness to accept to sell information in 
experiments.19 In surveys, the average willingness to accept payment for personal 
information is five times higher than the willingness to pay to protect private 
information (WTA:WTP ratio of 5.47).20 This almost doubles the average ratio for 
other goods (2.92).21 
Privacy valuations present some patterns, but they are scarce. People value their 
offline information, such as facts about themselves, three times more than online 
information, such as their browsing patterns.22 Regarding offline information, people 
value the protection of undesirable traits more than that of desirable traits, even 
when these lead to no direct pecuniary changes.23 More importantly for the topic at 
hand, people value information about their medical status the most, along with 
financial information and information about their family.24  
Context is also extremely relevant for people when deciding whether to disclose 
information. When decisions on privacy become simpler, people tend to show a 
higher valuation of privacy, closer to the valuation disclosed on surveys.25 In the 
same vein, when security settings and privacy risks are more visible, for example on 
                                                            
 16 Spiekermann et al., supra note 15, at 45; Berendt et al., supra note 15, at 102, 104. 
 17 Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information 
Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 36, 36 (G. Danezis & P. Golle eds., 
2006); Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual 
Decision Making, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 26, 26 (2005). 
 18 Alastair Beresford et al., Unwillingness to Pay for Privacy: A Field Experiment, 117 
ECON. LETTERS 25, 26-27 (2012). 
 19 Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, Beliefs and Behaviors: Internet Users’ 
Understanding of Behavioral Advertising, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE 1, 25-26 (2010). 
 20 Alessandro Acquisti et al., What is Privacy Worth?, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 267-68 
(2013). 
 21 Id. at 268. 
 22 Juan Pablo Carrascal et al., Your Browsing Behavior for a Big Mac: Economics of 
Personal Information Online, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 22ND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
WORLD WIDE WEB 189, 189 (2013). 
 23 Bernardo Huberman et al., Valuating Privacy, 3 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 22, 22 
(2005). 
 24 Daniel Horne & David Horne, Domains of Privacy: Toward an Understanding of 
Underlying Factors, in DIRECT MARKETING EDUCATORS’ CONFERENCE (1998). 
 25 Luc Wathieu & Allan Friedman, An Empirical Approach to Understanding Privacy 
Valuation 1-6 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 07-075, 2007). 
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internet browsers, people react with an increased protection of their information.26 
People value having control over the publicity of their personal information.27 
However, in the medical context, at least for mobile applications, it is rarely the case 
that privacy policies make privacy concerns visible.28 
B. We Cannot Monetize Privacy 
This risk of privacy breaches represents the disutility of any use that can be made 
with the traded information that is unpleasant to the person; hence, an individual 
should take it into account as an expected cost when deciding whether to disclose. 
Therefore, the materialization of such risk can take many forms, the most common 
ones ranging from mostly harmless annoyances, such as receiving spam email, to 
more serious consequences, such as public disclosure of embarrassing information or 
the acquisition of information by medical insurers or future employers that would 
financially damage the person, identity fraud, or identity theft.  
When data controllers trade someone’s personal information, that person has an 
increased risk of suffering a privacy breach.29 The user will have his or her personal 
data out of his or her range of control, but its use by others still has the potential of 
impacting the individual’s welfare negatively, which means that there are 
externalities in data trading. These externalities imply an incentive for other actors to 
overuse the information.30 An example of actors that can impact a person’s welfare 
can be advertising companies, social networks, or, in the case of medical data, 
medical professionals and insurance companies.  
Moreover, people care not only about direct harm, but also about the indirect 
consequences that the transmission of their personal information can imply, 
particularly about how their information will be used, even if it will have no direct 
consequences for them (such as spam, fraud, or identity theft).31 
As observed, people’s reactions to privacy decisions change depending on a 
particular decision’s complexity.32 When information about privacy threats becomes 
visible, people sometimes respond to the threat by choosing higher privacy 
                                                            
 26 Julia Gideon et al., Power Strips, Prophylactics, and Privacy, Oh My!,  in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE SECOND SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY 133-40 (2006); Janice Tsai et 
al., The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental 
Study, 22 INFO. SYS. RES. 254, 263 (2011); Victoria Groom & Ryan Calo, Reversing the 
Privacy Paradox: An Experimental Study, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE 1-9 (2011). 
 27 Leslie John et al., Strangers on a Plane: Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive 
Information, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 858, 859 (2011). 
 28 Ali Sunyaev et al., Availability and Quality of Mobile Health App Privacy Policies, 22 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 28, 28 (2015). 
 29 John Hagel & Jeffrey Rayport, The Coming Battle for Consumer Information, 75 HARV. 
BUS. REV. 53, 53 (1997). 
 30 Peter Swire & Robert Litan, None of Your Business: World Data Flows, Electronic 
Commerce and the European Privacy Directive, 12 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 683, 684 (1998). 
 31 Wathieu & Friedman, supra note 25, at 7. 
 32 Id. at 2; John et al., supra note 27, at 268. 
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protections.33 Many times, people do not understand privacy policies and license 
agreements34 and the available privacy protection tools.35 Protecting privacy requires 
technical skills that few people have.36 This necessity can largely explain the 
contradicting results of the experimental literature and the difficulties in identifying a 
single monetary value for privacy.37 
For this reason, if personal data are treated equally in experimental settings and 
security settings and privacy risks are not visible, contradicting results might be 
reached.38 This issue highlights the usefulness of the proposal made in this article, 
which focuses on visibility and one particular type of personal information:  health 
data. 
III. COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL INTERVENTIONS 
A. Quality Adjusted Life Years 
In the face of limited budgets for healthcare spending and multiple potential 
treatments that could be funded, the use of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) has 
become widespread in medical decision-making.39 For example, the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence in England, the body responsible for offering 
guidance on the medical spending of public funds, has fully embedded the CEA 
methodology into its decision-making processes.40 CEA is a formal procedure based 
on estimations of the costs and benefits of each treatment. Its fundamental idea is to 
choose health interventions that offer the greatest benefit for the smallest costs. In 
the simplest case, if treatment A cures a condition at cost x and treatment B cures it at 
cost y, and y<x, then treatment B is preferred over treatment A.  
Several problems arise when comparing health outcomes across potential 
treatments. Perhaps most importantly, one must determine how to compare the 
outcomes of two different health technologies that affect different aspects of a 
patient’s health. For example, one medication may lower cholesterol levels while 
another may provide pain relief. These two medicines would be difficult to compare 
along a single scale. 
                                                            
 33 Gideon et al., supra note 26, at 142; Tsai et al., supra note 26, at 254. 
 34 George Milne & Mary Culnan, Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy Risks: Why 
Consumers Read (or Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices, 18 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 15, 
23 (2004). 
 35 Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 17. 
 36 Joseph Turow, Americans and Online Privacy: The System is Broken, ANNENBERG PUB. 
POL’Y CTR. U. PA. 25 (2003). 
 37 Ignacio Cofone, The Value of Privacy: Keeping the Money Where the Mouth Is 1-5 
(Rotterdam Inst. Law & Econ., RILE Working Paper No. 2014-15, 2015). 
 38 Wathieu & Friedman, supra note 25, at 2. 
 39 David O. Meltzer & Peter C. Smith, Theoretical Issues Relevant to the Economic 
Evaluation of Health Technologies, in 2 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 433-34 (Mark V. 
Pauly et al. eds., 2011). 
 40 S. Bryan et al., Seeing the NICE Side of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis: A Qualitative 
Investigation of the Use of CEA in NICE Technology Appraisals, 16 HEALTH ECON. 179, 179 
(2007). 
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In order to rank treatments on a comparable scale, researchers use the concept of 
QALYs.41 A QALY represents the value of living one year in a perfect health 
condition, and this baseline is used as a proxy for the quality of one’s life during that 
year.42 To be precise, the benefit of a particular treatment is translated into the gain 
in QALYs that the treatment is expected to provide. Quality-adjusted life-years are 
used, rather than simply life-years, in order to account for the fact that both the 
duration and quality of an individual’s life matter. In our example of pain-lowering 
and cholesterol-lowering medications, while the cholesterol medication may extend 
life by three more years, the improved quality of life offered by the reduction in pain 
might give us a reason to favor this intervention instead.  
Quality of life or health status is typically scored between 0 and 1, with 0 
representing death and 1 representing perfect health.43 Consider a person who will 
live during a four-year timespan with a health status scored at 0.5. During those four 
years, this individual will have experienced two QALYs. Since a QALY represents a 
year lived in perfect health, this four-year window is considered the equivalent of 
living two years in perfect health. An example of the QALYs that a standard person 
has over a lifetime is shown below in Figure 1. As an individual’s age increases, 
especially in advanced years, his or her health status falls. In this example, the 
individual lived T years. The individual’s QALYs for each year are equal to the 
shaded area under the curve, which will obviously be smaller than 1 and will reach 0 
at time T. 
Figure 1: Example of QALYs over a lifetime 
                                                            
 41 Meltzer & Smith, supra note 39, at 439; J. Brazier et al., A Review of the Use of Health 
Status Measures in Economic Evaluation, 3 HEALTH TECH. ASSESSMENT 1, 3 (1999). 
 42 Brazier et al., supra note 41; Paul Dolan, The Measurement of Health Related Quality of 
Life for Use in Re-Source Allocation Decisions in Health Care, in 1B HANDBOOK OF HEALTH 
ECONOMICS 1723-26 (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., 2000). 
 43 Dolan, supra note 42, at 1726. 
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The next question that naturally arises is how one can quantitatively measure a 
person’s quality of life. The topic of measuring health utilities, as well as more 
general utilities, has been largely debated in health economics.44 In practice, three 
main tools are used to elicit health utility scores:  Visual Analogue Scale, Standard 
Gamble, and Time Trade-off.45  
B. Valuing Health States 
A vital step in CEA is the valuation of health states, which allows the calculation 
of QALYs. The three main tools used to elicit these health utility scores are the 
Visual Analogue Scale, the Standard Gamble, and the Time-Trade-Off. Each method 
begins with the description of the health state that the researcher needs to value.46 In 
order for the results to be as generalizable as possible and to avoid any 
preconceptions about certain illnesses, the description is usually very general. Rather 
than naming actual conditions or diseases, health states are often given in terms of 
several different “dimensions” of health and well-being, such as mobility, self-care, 
ability of perform everyday tasks, pain or discomfort, and mental health.47 An 
example of a health state is given in Box 1.  
 
Box 1: Example of a health state 
The Visual Analogue Scale simply asks individuals to pinpoint visually on a 
scale from 0 to 100 how much they would value the health state described above, 
where 0 is equivalent to death and 100 is equivalent to perfect health.48 The average 
value pointed by individuals is then directly translated to QALYs. An example of the 
Visual Analogue Scale is depicted in Box 2 below.49  
                                                            
 44 See generally ECONOMIC EVALUATION IN HEALTH CARE: MERGING THEORY WITH 
PRACTICE (M.F. Drummond & A. McGuire eds., 2001) (discussing theoretical underpinnings 
of economic evaluations of health care). 
 45 Paul Dolan & Matthew Sutton, Mapping Visual Analogue Scale Health State Valuations 
onto Standard Gamble and Time Trade-off Values, 44 SOC. SCI. MED. 1519, 1519 (1997). 
These methods are further explained in the following subsection. 
 46 Paul Dolan et al., Valuing Health States: A Comparison of Methods, 15 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 209, 210 (1996). 
 47 Id. at 215; Dolan & Sutton, supra note 45, at 1519, 1521. 
 48 David Parkin & Nancy Devlin, Is There a Case for Using Visual Analogue Scale 
Valuations in Cost-Utility Analysis?, 15 HEALTH ECON. 653, 655 (2006). 
 49 The line is often portrayed vertically, although this is not uniform. 
Health State A 
• You	  have	  poor	  mobility	  
• You	  have	  some	  problems	  washing	  and	  dressing	  yourself	  
• You	  have	  some	  problems	  with	  performing	  your	  usual	  
activities	  
• You	  experience	  moderate	  pain	  or	  discomfort	  
• You	  are	  not	  anxious	  or	  depressed	  
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
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Box 2: Visual Analogue Scale 
In a Standard Gamble, on the other hand, people compare two situations, the 
described health state and perfect health in order to elicit from their answer their 
perceptions on the relative merit of those situations.50 The QALY value is 
established by the lowest probability of living in perfect health that people consider 
to be high enough to take the treatment that “cures” them from the described health 
state.51 For example, if patient A is indifferent between living with chronic migraines 
and taking a treatment that will (i) cure his or her migraines with a probability of 
95% and (ii) cause death with a probability of 5%, then the QALY value of the 
treatment is 0.95. The Standard Gamble method presents individuals with a 
described scenario such as the following:52 
 
  
Box 3: Standard Gamble 
Mathematically, one tries to elicit the following equality from the individual. 𝑈 𝐻! = 𝑝 𝑈(𝐻!"##  !"#$%!) + 1 − 𝑝 𝑈(𝐻!"#$!)  
Where 𝑈(. ) is the individual’s utility function. Given that 𝑈(𝐻!"##  !"#$%!) = 1 
and  𝑈 𝐻!"#$! = 0  , the utility of 𝐻!  is then given by p. The intuition behind this 
is that, if someone under the described health state would be willing to risk death 
with a probability of 5% to obtain perfect health for a year, then that health state is 
for them 95% as good as perfect health. 
The Time-Trade-Off method, in turn, takes time into account. In this method, 
respondents make a choice similar to that of the Standard Gamble, but among a 
number of years in perfect health (X) versus a number of years with the health 
problem (Y), and the ratio among them (X:Y) determines the QALY value.53 If the 
                                                            
 50 Brazier et al., supra note 41, at 37. 
 51 Milton C. Weinstein et al., QALYs: The Basics, 12 VALUE HEALTH 55, 55, 58 (2009). 
 52 Id. at 57. 
 53 Id. 
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“Imagine you are currently experiencing health state A. There is a 
treatment available that, if successful, will allow you to return back to 
perfect health. The treatment has probability p of being successful. 
However, there is probability 1-p that the treatment fails and kills you. At 
what probability (p) would you be indifferent between taking the treatment 
and not taking the treatment?” 
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patient A from the example above is indifferent between living for 50 more years 
with migraines and living 40 more years in perfect health, then the QALY value of 
the treatment is 0.8. Time-Trade-Off presents individuals with a scenario such as the 
following:54 
  
Box 4: Time Trade-off 
Mathematically: 𝑈 𝐻! ∗ 10 = 𝑈 𝐻!"##  !"#$%! ∗ 𝑛 
Again, given that 𝑈(𝐻!"##  !"#$%!) = 1, the utility of 𝐻! is then given by 𝑛/10. 
In this way, QALYs can, albeit imperfectly, quantify dimensions of different 
health states and diverse treatments, such as pain, that are otherwise unquantifiable. 
QALYs give policymakers and health professionals a framework to take these 
dimensions into account and evaluate treatments more accurately without 
disregarding either the dimension or the treatment. 
C. Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio 
Once a program’s benefits have been translated into gains in QALYs, the ICER 
is calculated.55 This ratio measures the incremental cost of the incremental gain of 
program A compared with program B.56 In the formula below, 𝑄! and 𝑄! are the 
QALY values associated with programs A and B, respectively, and 𝐶! and 𝐶! are the 
costs associated with them. 𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑅 = 𝑄! − 𝑄!𝐶! − 𝐶!  
In practice, new programs are compared to the “usual care” of patients who are 
targeted by the treatment.57 In the representation above, the usual care would be 
program A. In the example of a new cholesterol medication, the new treatment would 
be compared to the medication that is currently used to lower cholesterol. If a 
medication were completely novel, in the sense that it is designed to treat a condition 
for which there currently exists no standard treatment, the comparison parameter 
would be “no care.”58 
                                                            
 54 Id. 
 55 Andrew H. Briggs et al., Pulling Cost-Effectiveness Analysis up by Its Bootstraps: A 
Non-Parametric Approach to Confidence Interval Estimation, 6 HEALTH ECON. 327, 327 
(1997). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Meltzer & Smith, supra note 39. 
 58 Id. 
“Imagine you are currently experiencing health state A. You are given the 
following choice. You can either continue to live in health state A for 10 
years, at which point you will die. Alternatively, you can give up some of 
these 10 years and live n years in perfect health (where n<10). At what 
number of years (n) would you be indifferent between the two 
alternatives?” 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
12 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1 
 
ICER can be thought of as the dollar cost per each additional QALY point when 
moving from treatment A to B. Decision-makers can therefore use ICER values to 
select the most cost-effective treatments. The lower the ICER value is, the more 
cost-effective the treatment is compared to others that achieve equivalent results.  
If there is a given healthcare budget to spend, programs can be ranked inversely 
in terms of their ICER values and implemented until the budget is depleted, thereby 
maximizing health benefits within a given budget constraint. An alternative approach 
in the situation where there is no budget constraint is to compare each ICER to a 
threshold value that can be thought of as the maximum amount that a government is 
willing to spend on each additional QALY.  
IV. PLACING PRIVACY IN COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSES 
A. Quantification Based on Monetary Costs 
To operationalize the proposed change, it is theoretically possible to embed 
privacy concerns into either the numerator or the denominator of the ICER 
equation—which is the ratio of the change in QALYs and in the costs of an 
intervention. Given these considerations, there seem to be two ways to incorporate 
privacy concerns into ICER evaluations. The first way to incorporate privacy 
concerns is to include privacy in the costs of health treatments. The second is to 
include privacy concerns as a moderating element in the benefit section of ICER 
evaluations—that is, within QALYs themselves.  
Incorporating privacy issues as part of the monetary costs of a medical 
intervention is an intuitive idea. After all, by virtue of presenting privacy disutilities 
or potential privacy harms to patients who are being monitored, e-health treatments 
have an extra cost, even if non-monetary. If one cares about the well-being of those 
patients or about social welfare, there is no reason why, at the moment of evaluating 
the costs of these treatments, one should take into account the costs of treatments for 
hospitals but not the costs for patients themselves. 
However, incorporating privacy concerns in the cost section of ICER evaluations 
presents the obstacle of the indeterminacy of the privacy concerns’ monetization. 
Monetizing privacy, as illustrated in Section II’s review of the experimental 
literature, is at best a difficult task.59 Surveys and experiments have given 
inconsistent results regarding how much to value privacy.60 More importantly, 
experiments with different designs have given inconsistent values among 
themselves, so one cannot attribute the inconsistency to a dissonance between 
declared and revealed preferences.61 
There are ways to partially, although not totally, overcome the problem of the 
indeterminacy of the privacy concerns’ monetization. The lessons learned from the 
experimental literature allow researchers to perform new experiments that are 
restricted to the context of e-health in particular. These new, restricted experiments 
could potentially give more accurate values for personal information, albeit still 
approximate, that could help implement privacy concerns. To do this, two chief 
issues should be kept in mind: the variable value of different types of information 
and the effects of privacy risk awareness. 
                                                            
 59 See supra Section II. 
 60 Acquisti et al., supra note 20, at 251-52. 
 61 See supra Section II. 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss1/5
2016] A HEALTHY AMOUNT OF PRIVACY 13 
 
The first lesson from the literature is that people value different kinds of 
information differently, so estimations on the value of information cannot be made 
on abstract notions such as “privacy” or “personal information.” Rather, they must 
be narrower. Sub-categories, such as “offline information” or “sensitive 
information,” are already a step in the right direction, but the use of sub-categories is 
likely insufficient to acquire useful results, as the sub-categories still include various 
types of information that people could value differently. In this way, one could 
conduct experiments regarding different kinds of information that are necessary for 
different treatments under evaluation. Location data is a good candidate because it is 
specific enough for people to have a realistic representation of it during the 
experiment, and this type of data is included in several e-health treatments. 
The second lesson from the stream of literature is that privacy concerns are not 
always visible in experimental designs. Because privacy concerns are not always 
visible in experimental designs, they may lead to results that point to very low 
privacy valuations. The showing of low privacy valuations does not necessarily 
result because people actually attributed little value to the type of personal 
information involved, but it can also result because the individuals were not fully 
aware of the risks that the disclosure involved. If experiments are run in the context 
of e-health, they should make sure that the privacy costs involved are visible to the 
subjects. 
Keeping the two lessons garnered from the literature in mind, it is possible to run 
incentivized experiments specifically aimed at arriving at a monetary price for 
privacy concerns related to different types of health data. The very nature of health 
data might make it easier to tackle both of the lessons mentioned and conduct 
experiments with specific types of personal information and visible privacy costs. 
Experiments gauging the value of privacy in e-health, from this perspective, could 
also potentially shed more light onto the “privacy paradox.”  
It would be difficult to know in advance if the experiments gauging the value of 
privacy in e-health would give higher or lower valuations than those conducted 
previously because two effects that run in opposite directions are present. On one 
hand, decisions in e-health typically include more sensitive information than 
decisions in shopping simulations. One may expect individuals to become sensitive 
regarding their private information when it consists of data regarding medical 
history. In expectation, an individual’s privacy is more reduced when facing a data 
leak regarding information about one’s potential diseases than when facing a leak 
regarding one’s shopping patterns, even if the latter could also lead in turn to more 
sensitive information. The distinction between health information and information 
regarding standard shopping patterns could lead people to disclose less than average 
in privacy-related experiments.  
On the other hand, decisions in e-health typically have a larger trade-off than 
decisions in shopping simulations. The health benefits that e-health treatments 
provide over standard treatments are, on average, significantly more valuable than 
the shopping discounts used in traditional privacy experiments. It is not equally 
beneficial to reduce one’s possibility of having a heart attack or appropriate 
maintenance of a lupus condition than having the ability to save a few dollars when 
purchasing a blow dryer. This difference in long-term benefits could lead people to 
choose to disclose more information in the e-health context. 
If such experiments did indeed give sensible and theoretically consistent 
estimates of the monetary costs of the reduction of privacy that an e-health treatment 
implies, it would become a relatively simple task to include these values in ICER 
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ratios. The only task to be performed would be to add the experimentally estimated 
monetary costs of privacy to the 𝐶! and 𝐶!values in the denominator of the ICER 
ratio. There is, however, a simpler and cheaper way to quantify privacy concerns in 
e-health treatments. 
B. Quantification Based on Health States 
Monetizing privacy concerns would be difficult even with the best practices 
described. For this reason, this article proposes an alternative valuation method:  
embedding privacy costs within QALYs. Privacy costs can be embedded within the 
numerator, not the denominator, of the ICER ratio. This would imply using slightly 
altered versions the Health States measured by the Visual Analogue Scale, Standard 
Gamble, and Time-Trade-Off methods.  
To accomplish the task of embedding privacy costs within QALYs, a probability 
of the data becoming public can be included in the descriptions of the health states 
on which the Visual Analogue Scale, Standard Gamble, and Time-Trade-Off 
operate. Imagine that a new medical intervention is available for a particular illness. 
This intervention (intervention A) raises a patient’s health from 𝐻! to 𝐻! (where 𝐻! > 𝐻!). However, the intervention also involves continuous external collection of 
the patient’s sensitive data, such as heart rate and location. In order to assess the 
utility of this treatment, the privacy concerns of patients should be taken into 
account. And a slight alteration of the traditional Visual Analogue Scale, Standard 
Gamble, and Time-Trade-Off methods can easily measure patients’ privacy 
concerns. As before, each of these methods would begin with description of the 
health state under inspection, 𝐻!. However, in addition to the traditional 
“dimensions” of health, the health state would also describe the data being collected, 
state who has access to the data, and estimate the risk level (r) of a data breach. Box 
5 illustrates the suggested health state description. 
 
Box 5: Modification of health state description 
After presenting this altered version of health state A, its valuation would then 
continue as before. The resulting valuation of this health state, however, would give 
an estimate of the utility of being in health state A in addition to having the 
Health State A’ 
• You	  have	  poor	  mobility	  
• You	  have	  some	  problems	  washing	  and	  dressing	  yourself	  
• You	  have	  some	  problems	  with	  performing	  your	  usual	  
activities	  
• You	  experience	  moderate	  pain	  or	  discomfort	  
• You	  are	  not	  anxious	  or	  depressed	  
• Data	  on	  your	  heart	  rate	  is	  being	  collected	  
• Data	  on	  your	  location	  is	  being	  collected	  
• Your	  doctor	  and	  other	  employees	  of	  the	  hospital	  have	  
access	  to	  these	  data	  
• There	  is	  a	  2%	  risk	  (r)	  that	  the	  data	  becomes	  publicly	  
available	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corresponding level of privacy.  In other words, utility levels elicited through the 
proposed method, and the resulting QALYs, would incorporate the individual’s 
privacy concerns. In such a way, the QALYs would present a more complete picture 
of the monetary and non-monetary costs of the medical intervention. 
The initial step in valuing privacy concerns in this way could take place in an un-
incentivized experimental setting. Two groups of individuals would be given Visual 
Analogue Scale, Standard Gamble, and Time-Trade-Off questions. One of them 
would be faced with a health state description without the modifications specified 
above in Box 5, and one of them would see the health state with these modifications. 
If the privacy risks involved in data collection and storage are seen by patients as a 
significant disutility in the context of healthcare, then one would expect the average 
utility of patients under the modified health state (A’) to be lower than the utility of 
the group facing the unmodified health state (A). The results of the valuation in both 
groups would serve as an initial comparison. They would give an indication of the 
value placed by patients on that type of loss of that particular kind of personal 
information for that health benefit. Any large disparities between the modified health 
state and the non-modified health state might indicate that the ranking of programs 
based on traditional CEA methods does not represent true preferences. 
C. Methodological Questions 
There is ongoing debate as to which of the methods to estimate QALYs 
mentioned in the previous section gives the most accurate results.62 For example, 
while the Visual Analogue Scale is intuitively simple and quick to perform, some 
have suggested that the method may suffer from various biases.63 Individuals often 
avoid the extremes of the scale, leading to clustering around the middle values. From 
this perspective, Standard Gamble and Time Trade-Off are more robust. Between 
Standard Gamble and Time Trade-off, it has been suggested that Time-Trade-Off is 
generally more robust,64 although this conclusion largely depends on the concrete 
versions. Different valuation techniques can also perform better in different 
contexts.65  
The inclusion of privacy harm as an extra measure would probably not alter the 
considerations regarding the issue of which of these valuation techniques is more 
appropriate. Privacy concerns would need to be incorporated into each of the 
valuations performed with these techniques without altering the considerations that 
determine the choices among them. 
Still, there are obstacles to these alterations of the Visual Analogue Scale, 
Standard Gamble, and Time-Trade-Off methods. The first obstacle is that 
introducing a new variable and dimension into the elicitation technique in the form 
of privacy concerns would increase its complexity and could potentially confuse 
participants, resulting in less accurate measurements.  
                                                            
 62 Erik Nord, Methods for Quality Adjustment of Life Years, 34 SOC. SCI. MED. 559, 560 
(1992). 
 63 Parkin & Devlin, supra note 48. 
 64 Han Bleichrodt & Magnus Johannesson, Standard Gamble, Time Trade-Off and Rating 
Scale: Experimental Results on the Ranking Properties of QALYs, 16 J. HEALTH ECON. 155, 
156 (1997). 
 65 Nord, supra note 62, at 559-60. 
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To address the first obstacle, researchers would have to carefully design 
elicitation techniques that avoid scenarios that are too complex. Even if this 
modification is necessarily more intricate than health descriptions without privacy 
concerns, the same argument can be made for any measurement that is incorporated 
in the health state to measure patients’ well-being, such as anxiety or inability to 
perform daily tasks. In turn, one of the advantages of this elicitation technique 
compared to standard ways to measure privacy concerns is the visibility of the 
comparable health states. Even if the elicitation technique with privacy concerns is 
more complex than the same technique without them, it is still simpler than the 
alternative methods to measure these same concerns. 
The main potential obstacle in implementing this proposal is that including the 
privacy concerns in the utility calculations would increase the amount of data 
collection that a researcher would be required to perform. Currently, there are tables 
produced by research groups that conveniently list the utilities of health states at 
different dimensions of health, derived from a representative sample of a given 
population.66 Using the above methods, researchers would no longer be able to use 
these values directly and would instead have to collect data and administer the 
elicitation techniques themselves. Consequently, widespread use of this method may 
be costly unless the most commonly used databases of health utilities incorporate the 
method.  
If the obstacle to implementing the proposal turns out to be significant, it could 
be an interesting alternative to repeat the QALY estimation and ICER calculation on 
a few existing treatments with the inclusion of the altered elicitation techniques in 
order to get an impression of how the ICER values would change in each case.   
D. How Much is a QALY Worth 
In developed countries, the ICER values for new treatments—the cost for public 
health policies for increasing one QALY—typically lie between $50,000 and 
$200,000, depending on context.67 ICER is usually compared to the lower bound of 
that range, approximately $50,000.68 An ICER value below this amount is thought to 
be good value for money. While this value is useful as a starting point, a large 
amount of literature is aimed at determining a more accurate threshold that reflects 
the value that society places on a QALY, rather than how much is usually spent on 
one. If a convincing estimate can be made for this value, then all programs with an 
ICER value below this point, which can give a person one quality adjusted life year 
at a lower social cost, should be funded. 
The standard alternative approach to ICER has been to derive a value using 
traditional willingness-to-pay methodology, which has reached widely varied 
                                                            
 66 The most frequently used database of health utilities is the EQ-5D, produced by the 
EuroQol Group. The database uses five dimensions to separate health states: mobility, self-
care, usual activities, pain or discomfort and anxiety or depression. Another method is HUI3, 
which uses eight dimensions: vision, hearing, speech, ambulation, pain, dexterity, cognition, 
and emotional state. See Brazier et al., supra note 41. 
 67 CAM DONALDSON ET AL., EUROPEAN VALUE OF A QUALITY ADJUSTED LIFE YEAR 32-33 
(2011). 
 68 Richard A. Hirth et al., Willingness to Pay for a Quality-Adjusted Life Year in Search of 
a Standard, 20 MED. DECISION MAKING 332, 332-33 (2000). 
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estimations.69 Some research based on the willingness-to-pay methodology has 
valued QALYs at an average of €306,000 ($346,160) for thirty-five estimates.70 
However, most research has found lower monetary estimations for the willingness to 
pay for QALYs, closer, but still higher, than the lower bound of ICER values. In the 
European Union, a EuroVaQ report covering ten representative European countries 
reached an average willingness to pay of €65,000 ($73,510) per QALY.71 A study 
surveying the literature on the topic has found that most estimations range between 
€100,000 and €150,000 ($113,000 and $169,700) per QALY.72 If these studies are 
accurate, they seem to indicate that people value QALYs, on average, at higher 
values than what is socially spent on them.73 
Another alternative approach can be found in Value of Statistical Life research, 
which is one of the most prominent examples of an objective measure of willingness 
to pay to avoid immaterial losses. The Value of Statistical Life literature attempts to 
monetize the probability of (essentially non-monetary) fatal accidents by asking how 
much a potential victim would be willing to pay to avoid facing a risk.74 When 
people engage in dangerous behavior, such as buying a risky product or performing a 
risky job, they are implicitly making a trade-off between money and their own 
safety. This choice would allow for estimating the value that they place on their own 
lives or their own characteristics, assuming perfect rationality and information. An 
aggregation of those values can in return provide the statistical value of a life.75  
Most of the losses that the Value of Statistical Life literature considers are non-
pecuniary losses,76 which encompass losses that are non-monetary; accordingly, a 
monetary compensation cannot always leave the victim equally well-off.77 Since a 
loss in privacy is, in essence, non-pecuniary,78 this method could be well equipped in 
dealing with its abstract nature. 
                                                            
 69 Id. at 332. 
 70 Id. at 338. 
 71 CAM DONALDSON ET AL., supra note 67. 
 72 See Don Kenkel, WTP- and QALY-Based Approaches to Valuing Health for Policy: 
Common Ground and Disputed Territory, 34 ENV'T. & RESOURCE ECON. 419 (2006). 
 73 Additionally, this would suggest that more money could be spent in public healthcare 
before reaching people’s average willingness to pay for health benefits. 
 74 See W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review 
of Market Estimates Throughout the World (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 9487, 2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9487.  
 75 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Flawed Hedonic Damages Measure of Compensation for 
Wrongful Death and Personal Injury, 20 J. FORENSIC ECON. 113 (2007); Eric A. Posner & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, 
Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205 (2004). 
 76 See Ted R. Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes of Age: Will the System Survive?, 93 NW. 
U. L. REV. 876 (1989) [hereinafter Miller, Willingness to Pay]. 
 77 Louis Visscher, Time is Money? A Law and Economics Approach to 'Loss of Time' as 
Non-Pecuniary Loss, 5 J. EUR. TORT L. 35, 35-36 (2014) [hereinafter Visscher, Time is 
Money?]. 
 78 When a person faces a privacy violation, his reduction in utility cannot be fully repaired 
by a monetary compensation. The compensation can attempt to increase his utility to leave 
 
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
18 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1 
 
The value of QALYs has not been estimated with the Value of Statistical Life 
approach. However, one could expect the Value of Statistical Life approach to value 
QALYs much higher than the willingness-to-pay methodology. This is because the 
Value of Statistical Life methods consider both material and immaterial losses, while 
QALY only considers immaterial losses.79 
V. NORMATIVE CONSEQUENCES 
A. Advantages Over Alternative Methods 
There are several reasons why capturing privacy concerns in QALYs would be 
superior to the other available methods. Life states are goods more easily comparable 
between each other than are privacy versus monetary benefits. Consequently, 
individuals would better grasp the value of their private information and, therefore, 
the value of their privacy, when it is presented in a trade-off between different health 
states, as opposed to a trade-off between privacy and money. It is difficult for 
people, both in surveys and in a laboratory, to allocate a monetary value to 
something as abstract as privacy. But it is possible for individuals to compare two 
concrete and plausible life states and decide which one they prefer. In such a way, 
the method combines the best features of the surveys and experiments performed in 
the past in order to quantify privacy concerns. Like the experiments, it presents 
people with a trade-off that can elicit more precise answers than abstract questions. 
Like the surveys, it makes privacy issues more visible.  
Additionally, eliciting privacy concerns via comparisons between health states is 
highly relevant in the particular context of privacy issues raised by the collection of 
data by e-health treatments. The valuations obtained with the method proposed here 
will allow policymakers to directly measure the patient’s privacy costs in the context 
of health states, eliminating the intermediate step of applying general privacy 
valuations to the medical context. Compared to methods that rely on monetization, 
the method proposed here presents a much more direct way of measuring privacy 
concerns associated with medical interventions.  
Further, the proposed method can be altered to determine which types of 
collection methods and treatment-associated risks individuals are most responsive. 
The proposed method may be repeated with varying values of r to assess the 
sensitivity of the individual to different probabilities of data breach. For example, it 
may be the case that until a certain risk occurs, people are indifferent to a potential 
data leak.80 A further informative alteration to the method would be to change the 
type of data being collected. This modification would allow for measurements of 
how much more people value certain types of personal data over others. For 
                                                            
him in a similar position as the one he was before, but it can never leave him in exactly the 
same position. 
 79 Vaia Karapanou & Louis Visscher, The Magnitude of Pain and Suffering Damages from 
a Law and Economics and Health Economics Point of View (Rotterdam Inst. L. Econ. 
Working Paper No. 2009/02, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1327793 [hereinafter Karapanou 
& Visscher, Magnitude of Pain]. 
 80 This could be expected given people’s non-linear assessments of probabilities. See 
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 
47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979);  Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and 
Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 341 (1983). 
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instance, one can expect that preferences elicited based on collection of a patient’s 
heart rate would be lower than those based on the collection of sexually transmitted 
infections histories. 
B. How QALYs Fit the Law 
There are two further reasons to incorporate the policy suggestion made here. 
One reason to incorporate it is that QALYs were shown to be fitting to quantification 
in law.81 Another reason is that the proposal fits with the reason why CEA and 
QALYs exist in the first place.  
The use of QALYs has been proposed in other areas to guide legal valuations on 
losses of quality of life.82 Their use has been suggested to estimate damages based on 
detailed and tailored scales in jury trials83 and within more general approaches that 
incorporate QALYs in tort law as a tool to quantify pain and suffering damages.84 
The tort use of the metric includes the possibility of considering QALYs as a way to 
estimate the value of loss of time.85 The fundamental idea behind this approach is 
that the extent to which tort law should compensate victims can be measured by how 
much they would have been willing to pay to prevent those losses in the first place 
when evaluated from an ex-ante perspective.86 
QALYs provide a more objective way to compare different kinds of immaterial 
losses.87 The more objective nature of QALYs makes them fitting to quantify 
immaterial losses in fields where this quantification would be helpful, or even 
necessary, to take these losses into account. The estimation of damages in tort law 
and the evaluation of treatments in public health policy, particularly within the CEA 
                                                            
 81 Ted R. Miller, Valuing Nonfatal Quality of Life Losses with Quality-Adjusted Life 
Years: The Health Economist’s Meow, 13 J. FORENSIC ECON. 145, 145 (2000) [hereinafter 
Miller, Valuing Nonfatal Quality]. 
 82 Vaia Karapanou & Louis Visscher, Towards a Better Assessment of Pain and Suffering 
Damages, 1 J. EUR. TORT L. 48, 48, 55 (2010) [hereinafter Karapanou & Visscher, Better 
Assessment of Damages]. 
 83 Miller, Willingness to Pay, supra note 76. 
 84 See Karapanou & Visscher, Better Assessment of Damages, supra note 82, at 48; 
Karapanou & Visscher, Magnitude of Pain, supra note 79; Vaia Karapanou & Louis Visscher, 
Quality Adjusted Life Years as a Way Out of the Impasse between Prevention Theory and 
Insurance Theory (Rotterdam Inst. L. Econ. Working Paper No. 2010/06, 2010), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1666141 [hereinafter Karapanou & Visscher, Way Out of the 
Impasse]. 
 85 Visscher, Time is Money?, supra note 77. The paper reached to an average amount of 
2.50 Euros per hour. For an application of QALY to Dutch tort law specifically within the 
same stream of literate, see Louis Visscher, QALY-tijd in de vaststelling van smartengeld bij 
letsel?, 4 TIJDSCHR. VOOR VERGOED. PERS. 93 (2013) (Neth.). 
 86 Visscher, Time is Money?, supra note 77; Karapanou & Visscher, Better Assessment of 
Damages, supra note 82. 
 87 Karapanou & Visscher, Magnitude of Pain, supra note 79; Karapanou & Visscher, 
Better Assessment of Damages, supra note 82, at 49. 
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literature, fall within these fields where quantification of immaterial is necessary for 
accuracy.88 
Comparing QALY values gives an estimation of the relative values of different 
possible treatments for the patient,89 so the estimation should be as accurate as 
possible. For privacy in e-health, estimations are easier and more straightforward 
than they are in the context of tort law, as in the context of e-health they need not 
assume instrumental rationality. 
The CEA literature, in which QALYs are traditionally embedded, was largely 
born out of a necessity to formally measure all costs and benefits of any particular 
treatment in the face of difficult policy decisions stemming from large healthcare 
costs and limited resources. When maximizing patients’ well-being subject to a 
budgetary constraint, there was no reason to take into account solely the monetary 
costs and benefits of each possible treatment. Similarly, in the face of growing 
concerns about privacy and as new medical interventions appear that track and store 
sensitive patient information, there is no reason to ignore this dimension of patients’ 
well-being.  
Insofar as privacy is an important consideration for patients’ well-being, it is 
sensible to impose some qualifier on e-health treatments by giving prevalence to 
those that avoid collecting large amounts of sensitive data or restrict such collection 
to the data that are strictly necessary for the treatment. This goal can be done 
formally through the CEA method described in the previous section. 
With the suggested policy, the ICER values of treatments will reflect societal 
preferences more accurately. Imagine that there are two potential treatments, A and 
B, which are equal in terms of monetary costs and (standard) QALY improvement 
when compared to the current treatment. However, treatment A involves the 
collection of data on patients’ medical history and its dissemination among a 
network of healthcare employees while treatment B does not. The current 
calculations of the ICER will give the impression that both treatments are identically 
beneficial. However, if patients prefer not to have their data collected, thereby 
preferring treatment B over treatment A, the treatments will not be equally beneficial. 
The calculation should be different because their wellbeing will be different under 
each treatment.  
C. Advancing Policy Discussions 
Another advantage of the suggested policy is that, given that it would allow for 
more accurate measurements of privacy costs, it would help advance the broader 
                                                            
 88 One should note that the tort law suggestions are made in the institutional context of 
European Tort Law, which has a much more limited recognition of pain and suffering 
damages than its American counterpart. The proposal of QALYs in tort law, therefore, means 
to expand the recognition of pain and suffering damages, not contract it as it probably would 
in American law. 
For the Netherlands in particular, where this proposal was made, the EuroVaQ report of 2010 
derived amounts of willingness to pay of between 34,000 and 43,000 Euros per QALY. For 
estimating non-pecuniary damages in this country, a value of 50,000 Euros per QALY has 
been suggested for corresponding with recent findings on willingness-to-pay within the 
country and for lying in the middle of the upper and lower boundaries of 20,000 and 80,000 
Euros, which are often mentioned. See Visscher, Time is Money?, supra note 77. 
 89 Karapanou & Visscher, Better Assessment of Damages, supra note 82, at 59-63. 
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discussion surrounding privacy and e-health. So far, there is little indication of how 
important privacy really is to patients and how important it should be for doctors and 
policymakers, especially in the face of possible health gains. Including privacy 
concerns in CEA through QALYs would give a concrete measure of its importance.  
Two major healthcare failures illustrate the usefulness of advancing the privacy 
discussion in this direction and the tensions that would be resolved.90 In the United 
Kingdom, an initiative of the National Health Service created a database of 
harmonized patient records named care.data with the idea that insurance and drug 
companies could purchase statistical health data from the database.91 The initiative, 
however, was halted after complaints from both patients and doctors.92 Patients and 
doctors specifically raised complaints about the right to object to the collection of 
data under European Data Protection Law,93 how the information would be used and 
stored securely, and the burden on doctors.94  The rollout of the scheme has been 
postponed at the time of writing this article in order to “listen and act on the views of 
patients, the public, GPs and stakeholders, and to explain the benefits and risks 
involved,”95 and it will likely be cancelled in the near future. 
The Netherlands put forth a proposal similar to the United Kingdom’s scheme 
through the Elektronisch Patiëntendossier (Electronic Patients’ File). The Electronic 
Patients’ File proposed to assemble the different pieces of information that doctors 
and healthcare providers possessed for each patient across the country.96 A unified 
database would facilitate information sharing among different medical professionals 
and other healthcare providers to improve the quality, safety, and efficiency of 
healthcare for Dutch patients.97 However, this initiative was also stopped due to 
                                                            
 90 These do not pertain remote patient monitoring, which has been used as an example of 
e-health so far, but they pertain the administration of electronic health records. These also 
affect patients’ privacy, although while remote patient monitoring mainly (although not 
exclusively) impacts privacy at the stage of collecting personal information, electronic health 
records do so at the storage stage. 
 91 Randeep Ramesh, NHS Patient Data to Be Made Available for Sale to Drug and 
Insurance Firms, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/19/nhs-patient-data-available-companies-buy. 
 92 Sarah Boseley, NHS to Scrap Single Database of Patients’ Medical Details, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 6, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/06/nhs-to-scrap-
single-database-of-patients-medical-details. 
 93 Council Directive 95/46, art. 14, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC). 
 94 See Ian Sample, Public Should Be Consulted on NHS Medical Data-Sharing Scheme, 
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/feb/03/medical-
data-sharing-scheme-nuffield; Ramesh, supra note 91. 
 95 The care.data programme, NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE OF ENGLAND (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/tsd/care-data/.; Letter from Tim Kelsey, Nat'l Dir. For 
Patients and Info., Nat'l Health Serv. of England., to his colleagues (Apr. 14, 2014), 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/cd-stakeholder-lett.pdf.  
 96 Marieke Zwaanswijk et al., Benefits and Problems of Electronic Information Exchange 
as Perceived by Health Care Professionals: An Interview Study, 11 BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES. 
no. 256 1 (2011). 
 97 Basit Chaudhry et al., Systematic Review: Impact of Health Information Technology on 
Quality, Efficiency, and Costs of Medical Care, 144 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 742, 748 (2006). 
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privacy concerns.98 In particular, the public was concerned with the broad scope of 
people that would have access to the data and the enhanced risks of having such 
large amounts of sensitive information in one single database, given the possibility 
of personal data being leaked.99 
The rollout of both care.data and the Electronic Patients’ File failed because the 
general public became wary about the access and security of their personal data, 
probably legitimately so.100 The creators of the policies did not sufficiently take into 
account privacy considerations when creating or developing these policies. In failing 
to consider privacy concerns, the policies resulted in significant amounts of efforts 
and money going to waste.  
The creators of the policies might have cared about privacy, and they most surely 
cared about their policies’ long-term success, but they did not have a tool to 
accurately estimate the weight that they should have given to privacy concerns.101 
Different versions of both of these policies, incorporating privacy concerns, could 
have withstood public scrutiny. As these examples illustrate, this article’s proposal 
would not only benefit patients, but would also protect policies from failure after the 
government has already invested significant money and resources. Even if the 
method turned to be inaccurate as a tool for predicting constituents’ privacy 
concerns, it could show that privacy concerns were seriously taken into account, 
therefore eliminating the discussion’s dichotomy and providing a common ground 
for deliberation. 
D. Doctrinal Implications 
While exploring in detail the legal framework of privacy in health is beyond the 
scope of this article, mapping how its underlying principles can be better achieved 
by the proposal made here can be useful to understand the normative implications of 
the policies just described.  
                                                            
 98 The legislative power rejected the initiative unanimously. After that, 44 regional 
databases were set up under an opt-in basis. Eerste Kamer verwerpt patiëntendossier [Senate 
Rejects Patient File], NU.NL (Apr. 5, 2011) (Neth.) [hereinafter Senate Rejects Patient File], 
http://www.nu.nl/politiek/2484753/eerste-kamer-verwerpt-patientendossier.html. After that, 
44 regional databases were set up under an opt-in basis. Lot LSP in handen van zorgverleners 
[LSP Fate in the Hands of Health Care Providers], PHARMACEUTISCH WEEKBLAD 
[PHARMACEUTICAL WEEKLY] (Sept. 27, 2011) (Neth.), http://www.pw.nl/nieuws/2011/lot-lsp-
in-handen-van-zorgverleners. 
 99 Wetsvoorstel EPD verworpen en overig nieuws [SPD Rejected Bill and Other News], 
EERSTE KAMER DER STATEN-GENERAAL [SENATE OF THE STATES GENERAL] (Aug. 31, 2016) 
(Neth.), https://www.eerstekamer.nl/nieuws/20110405/wetsvoorstel_epd_verworpen_en.; 
Senate Rejects Patient File, supra note 98. 
 100 Senate Rejects Patient File, supra note 98. 
 101 So far we have worked with situations in which a health insurance or a national health 
service covers treatments. It is not entirely clear what would happen when a treatment crosses 
jurisdictional boundaries with different privacy governance regimes and there is no clear 
applicable law. See Bonnie Kaplan & Sergio Litewka, Ethical Challenges of Telemedicine 
and Telehealth, 17(4) CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 401, 401 (2008). For cases 
between the U.S. and the E.U., this situation could be addressed by referring to the Privacy 
Shield. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, E.U.-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US-Framework (last visited Nov. 12, 2016). 
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The law recognizes already the importance of privacy specifically for medical 
data. Health data are riskier and more sensitive than other kinds of personal data, and 
their special legal protection reflects this increased importance and sensitivity.102 In 
the U.S., patients’ health data are protected by various specific regulations that 
capture the increased sensitivity of medical data when compared to other kinds of 
personal data and grant medical data enhanced protection, the most important of 
these being the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).103 But 
HIPAA covers only the privacy and security of clinical data (not commercial data) 
that are managed by a healthcare organization. E-Health devices that do not fit into 
this category fall into standard consumer protection and contract law. According to 
the Federal Trade Commission, these privacy claims would need a contractual 
basis.104  
Similarly, in the E.U. Data Protection Framework, the idea of the increased 
sensitivity of medical data is captured in the provisions of the Data Protection 
Directive regarding health data, but in a much broader way.105 In line with its 
increased sensitivity, the current Directive and the coming GDPR establish health 
data as a special category, requiring a higher level of protection in the form of 
consent for such data collection or processing.106  
The proposal made here advances the aims of these legal frameworks in two 
ways. The first relates to consent. The second relates to common fair information 
practice principles.  
                                                            
 102 See Bonnie Kaplan, Patient Health Data Privacy, in SHLOMIT YANISKY-RAVID, BEYOND 
IP: THE FUTURE OF PRIVACY (Fordham U. Press, forthcoming 2017). 
 103 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 242k, 1320d 
(2016). Most relevant are the Administrative Simplification rules: the Privacy rule, the 
Transactions and Code Sets rule, the Security rule, the Unique Identifiers rule, and the 
Enforcement rule. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act §§ 261-64; 45 
C.F.R. §§ 160, 164(A), 164(E) (2016) (privacy rule); 45 C.F.R. § 162(J) (2016) (transactions 
and code sets rule); 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164(A), 164(C) (2016) (security rule); 45 C.F.R. § 
162(D) (2016) (unique identifiers rule); 45 C.F.R. §§ 160(C)-(E) (2016) (HIPPA enforcement 
rule). 
 104 “Acne Cure” Mobile App Marketers Will Drop Baseless Claims Under FTC 
Settlements, FTC (Sept. 8, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2011/09/acne-cure-mobile-app-marketers-will-drop-baseless-claims-under. The data 
privacy provision of the Communications Act is also applicable to the transfer of health data. 
See Anne Marie Helm & Daniel Georgatos, Privacy and mHealth: How Mobile Health 
“Apps” Fit into a Privacy Framework Not Limited to HIPAA, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 131, 148-
58 (2014) (arguing the extent to which the presence of health information in mHealth does not 
limit the privacy law analysis to HIPAA). 
 105 Council Directive 95/46, art. 6, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC). Unlike in the U.S., in the E.U., 
health data is defined as any data that relate to health. The General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), which will replace the Directive in May 25, 2018, follows the Directive on this issue. 
 106 Council Directive 95/46, art. 8(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC); Council Directive 95/46, 
recitals 33-34, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC). In order to ensure an adequate level of health 
protection, the directive also limits the applicability of special categories of data when data 
processing is necessary for the provision of health care or the management of healthcare 
services. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 8(3), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC). 
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In both of the jurisdictions described, the key aspect of health data’s special 
protection when compared to other forms of data revolves around the increased 
importance of consent.107 Although regulations differ from one jurisdiction to 
another, the patient’s consent is necessary to transfer medical data to a third party in 
all jurisdictions.108 The role that the consent requirement plays in determining 
medical treatments is addressing the need to ensure that patients are informed of all 
aspects of the technology, including the privacy aspect.  
It is impossible for healthcare providers to inform patients of treatments’ privacy 
consequences if they ignore these consequences themselves. Thus, the method 
proposed here is a useful exercise not only for health policy to determine the best 
medical treatments under all dimensions, but also to pull doctor-patient relations 
closer to HIPAA standards. By making privacy costs salient to healthcare providers, 
it enables them to communicate all implications of medical treatments to patients 
and makes a step forward towards patients’ consent.109 
The proposal is also supported by a substantive interpretation of widespread fair 
information practice principles—in particular, the collection limitation principle and 
the purpose specification principle. The collection limitation principle, besides 
mandating that information collection be limited and performed through lawful and 
fair means, suggests that it must be minimal for the purpose to which the collection 
takes place,110 an idea that is also reflected in HIPAA’s minimum necessary 
standard.111 The purpose specification principle and, indirectly, the data quality 
principle, establish that the collection of data must be relevant for the purpose of the 
collection.112  
A health policy that approves medical treatments without measuring each 
treatment’s impact on privacy will often—if not always—breach these principles, as 
it will be blind to data collection and processing. Currently, it is difficult—if not 
                                                            
 107 Melissa M. Goldstein, Health Information Technology and the Idea of Informed 
Consent, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 27, 34 (2010); Kaplan & Litewka, supra note 101, at 406-07. 
 108 TIMOTHY S. JOST, READINGS IN COMPARATIVE HEALTH LAW AND BIOETHICS (Carolina 
Academic Press, 2007); Kaplan, supra note 102. However, HIPAA mandates so “as 
appropriate.” 
 109 Consent operates in two dimensions: consenting to the processing of one’s personal data 
and consenting to a treatment. While these can be conflated in practice, they operate 
differently (for the second, HIPAA requires informed consent). Both would be enhanced by 
the policy proposed here. 
 110 GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL 
DATA, ORG. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (1980) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]; see also 
LINDA KOONTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY IN THE EVOLVING HEALTHCARE ENVIRONMENT 7-10 
(2013). 
 111 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act §§ 261–64; 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 
164(A), 164(E) (2016). See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE 
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-
regulations/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE]. 
 112 GUIDELINES, supra note 110; see also KOONTZ, supra note 110. However, HIPAA 
allows for secondary use of information without consent when it is necessary for research, 
public health, law enforcement, judicial proceedings, or any other public interest activity. See 
SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 111. 
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impossible—to know whether a treatment (A) is necessary or proportionate 
compared to another less privacy invasive treatment (B). In the simplest case, where 
A and B achieve the same result, some account of their privacy aspects must take 
place to illustrate the superiority of A and avoid leaving a healthcare provider 
indifferent between them. In a more interesting case, where A provides a slightly 
better health benefit, but is significantly more privacy-invasive than B, a method of 
quantification like the one proposed here allows for comparison in accordance with 
these principles. This method could potentially show a disproportion such that we 
would not consider treatment A to be acceptable. Thus, these fair information 
practice principles would be better fulfilled with the method proposed here.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
As medical treatments have become increasingly invasive and data intensive, 
concerns have been raised regarding the privacy of patients.113 The discussion 
regarding privacy concerns has become increasingly important for both medical 
professionals and patients, resulting in some interventions being halted in order to 
assess the possibility of data breaches. 114 
This article proposes a method to formalize the discussion regarding privacy 
concerns by giving some indication of the value of personal information in a medical 
context and by including privacy in the overall costs and benefits of a given medical 
program. This article suggests this be accomplished by incorporating privacy 
concerns into the cost-effectiveness framework that is already established and in use 
in public health policy.  
In order to incorporate privacy into the cost-effectiveness ratio, some kind of cost 
must be assigned to a decline in privacy. It was shown, however, that measuring the 
“price” of privacy through monetary costs is a difficult procedure that often results in 
paradoxical and inconsistent results, especially when the trade-off is presented in the 
typical context of purchase history information.  
If monetization of privacy harms is to be attempted, I suggest, as a second best 
option, similar trade-off experiments where the data being collected are instead 
presented as sensitive health information. Experimental settings should be wary of 
the variable value of different types of information and the effects of privacy risk 
awareness. Therefore, this method would give more accurate results.  
To more adequately measure privacy concerns, the current approach should shift 
to incorporate a method whereby the cost of privacy is embedded in the 
measurements of health states. Using the Visual Analogue Scale, Standard Gamble, 
and Time-Trade-Off methods with minor alterations yields utility measurements of a 
given health state, as well as a given level of privacy invasion. These methods can be 
extended to measure utility under different categories of information and 
probabilities of data breach. In this framework, the costs and benefits of a treatment 
are explicitly measured, and treatments with a high amount of data collection and a 
higher probability of making sensitive data public are given a concrete penalty, 
which allows for an objective comparison between potential medical interventions.  
If the proposed policy suggestion were to be followed in a few e-health 
treatments, its results could be tested against existing economic evaluations of 
different health treatments (QALY and ICER) in order to compare the outcomes of 
                                                            
 113 Id. 
 114 Id.; see Boseley, supra note 92. 
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the standard evaluations with those of the proposed application. The expected 
outcome of this test is that e-health treatments involving any kind of patient 
surveillance—and in particular, remote patient monitoring—will rank lower than in 
standard tests, accounting for the introduced privacy violations. It is uncertain, 
however, how much lower they will rank, and it will remain so until these 
evaluations are performed.115 Even when incorporating privacy elements, medical 
treatments would retain some, if not most, of their usefulness. 
Either way, such tests would push forward the discussion of privacy in medicine 
by giving us an objective measure. It would indicate if and how much we should 
take privacy concerns in e-health into account. 
 
                                                            
 115 Individuals may be more sensitive to breaches of medical data, but they may also be 
more responsive to health benefits. 
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